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BOOK REVIEW
THE LAW OF OBSCENITY. By Frederick F. Schauer. Washing-
ton, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1976. Pp. xv, 459.
$19.50.
Frederick F. Schauer accepts as a fact the existence of obscenity
laws, and his book analyzes relevant statutes and court decisions in
an effort to explain the historical development of obscenity regula-
tion and its treatment by the Supreme Court. Admitting at the
outset that obscenity is "a confused, vague and difficult area of the
law,"' Schauer calls his book "an exposition of the law" and "a
reference tool." 2
The book begins by examining obscenity control by the Church
during the sixteenth century, its civil takeover in seventeenth and
eighteen century England, and its eventual development in nine-
teenth century American law. The author then investigates the pol-
itical, social and psychological underpinnings of modern obscenity
regulation, especially the Supreme Court's emphasis on "stan-
dards." His inquiry includes a critical examination of the terms
"average person," "prurient interest" and "patently offensive," as
used by the Court. Particular emphasis is given to the Court's shift
from national to local standards in Miller v. California.' Observing
the Court's reliance on the doctrine of "overbreadth"' in striking
down certain obscenity statutes, Schauer reviews a multitude of
federal and state obscenity laws, focusing on regulatory procedures
and the differences between civil and criminal prosecutions.' Fi-
nally, he studies jury selection and instruction, trial tactics, and
other problems an attorney faces in preparing for the trial of an
obscenity case.
1. Schauer, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY viii (1976) [hereinafter cited as LAW OF OBSCENrrY].
2. Id. at ix.
3. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
4. The author describes the "overbreadth" doctrine as follows:
Essentially, overbreadth is a statutory defect which occurs when the statute punishes
not only that which can properly be made criminal or otherwise restricted, but also
that which cannot, without violating the Constitution, be made criminal. Thus, a
statute which prohibits both protected and unprotected speech is unconstitutionally
overbroad, and will be struck down by the courts.
LAW OF OBSCENITY at 154 (footnotes omitted).
5. Id. at 169-245.
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Chapter one of Professor Schauer's book focuses on early United
States obscenity regulation which was influenced by a strong reli-
gious belief in sexual morality. Court determinations of obscenity
and the extent of prosecution were heavily drawn from an English
case, Regina v. Hicklin,l which held that obscenity was to be de-
cided based on the content of "selected excerpts" from the work in
question. But the twentieth century brought a call for more exact
standards and procedures. In 1934, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals abandoned the "selected excerpts" test and ruled that a
book was to be judged on its literary value "as a whole."7 This
reasoning was widely followed during the next two decades; courts
used expert testimony, assessed a work's effect on the "average
person," and looked to the "dominant theme" of the work in judging
whether it was obscene.8
The Supreme Court molded these factors together and promul-
gated a "community standards" rule in the landmark case of Roth
v. United States.' While examining the "dominant theme" of the
work involved, Mr. Justice Brennan stated for the Court that ob-
scenity was not within the area of constitutionally protected speech
or press. ° Mr. Justice Harlan dissented, insisting that the federal
government's role should be limited to prohibition of hard-core por-
nography, but that states should be free to experiment with obscen-
ity laws."
In succeeding years, the conflicting opinions of Supreme Court
justices revealed the Court's failure to agree on objective principles.
The height of confusion was reached in Memoirs v. Massachusetts,'
where a plurality opinion-written by Mr. Justice Brennan-
insisted that three elements must coalesce before a work can be
found obscene:" (a) the dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is
patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community
6. L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868).
7. United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705, 707 (2d Cir. 1934).
8. Id. at 708.
9. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
10. Id. at 484.
11. Id. at 505-08 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Harlan adhered to this position in
Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476, 500-03 (1957), a companion case to Roth. See also LAW
OF OascENiry at 38-39.
12. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
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standards relating to the description or representation of sexual
matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social
value.""3
Commenting on the Memoirs case, Schauer says that this devel-
opment is "eminently logical," and he notes that the Court there-
after adopted a policy of banning only hard-core pronography.
Unfortunately for the reader, the author fails to note the dissent
of Mr. Justice White," who saw the true dimensions of the consti-
tutional question, indicated the error in the plurality opinion, and
foreshadowed the Miller opinion of 1973. Mr. Justice White said in
part:5
To say that material within the Roth definition of obscenity is nevertheless
not obscene if it has some redeeming social value is to reject one of the basic
propositions of the Roth case-that such material is not protected because
it is inherently and utterly without social value ....
Mr. Justice White not only concluded that "social importance" is
not an independent test of obscenity, but gave some words of wis-
dom that would be partially adopted in Miller:'"
Literary style, history, teachings about sex, character description (even of a
prostitute) or moral lessons need not come wrapped in such packages. The
fact that they do impeaches their claims to immunity from legislative cen-
sure.
In response to Memoirs, lower federal and state courts, as well as
many state legislatures moved with some indecent haste to revise
decisions and statutes on the basis of a so-called "Memoirs rule,"
even though it was only a plurality opinion.
The advent of the Burger Court in 1969 witnessed a return to the
Roth rule in Miller v. California. The Court stated that a work is
obscene if "(a) . . . 'the average person, applying contemporary
standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
the purient interest . . . ; (b) . . . the work depicts or describes,
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law; and (c) . . . the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. '"'7 And
13. Id. at 418.
14. Id. at 460 (White, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 461.
16. Id. at 462.
17. 413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted), quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972).
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so the third test of Memoirs-the "utterly without redeeming social
value" test-was rejected. According to Schauer, "[tihe
[tripartite] test must be taken in the context of the Court's pron-
ouncements that only hard-core pornography may be prosecuted,
and it must be remembered that only if material meets all of these
tests may it be legally obscene."'"
Psycho-Sociological Aspects and the Subjectivity of the Average
Person
Beginning with his third chapter, Schauer examines the complex
areas of the law which reflect a philosophy placing individual liberty
before the needs and demands of society. He insists that his purpose
is merely to expose-not espouse-the conflicting opinions."9 Ac-
cordingly, he presents the classic libertarianism associated with the
writings of John Stuart Mill, and argues that censorship has a
"chilling effect" on artistic and literary freedom. Then the author
presents the opposing view of those who favor strong obscenity laws
and who argue that virtually all laws embody some moral values
and represent the will of the majority. Schauer finds "difficulty" in
this latter position, especially because "speech is 'special' in our
system of government."20 He admits that the answer to this diffi-
culty depends on "a consideration of the theoretical basis of the
First Amendment." 2'
In this delineation of opposing positions, the author fails to indi-
cate that there is still another position-the widely-held belief in an
objective moral order, deriving from the Natural Law, and having
its interpretive light in Christian revelation. This was the philosoph-
ical/religious belief of those who drafted the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights. Perhaps the view adopted by most contemporary
legal philosophers is that of logical positivism, by which the moral
value of human acts is determined by changing times, places and
ideas. But great numbers of Americans are not disciples of this
thinking; their beliefs and reasoning constitute strong "community
standards" in many localities, and they must be reckoned with in
determining the objectivity of obscenity. From a tactical stand-
18. LAW OF OBSCENITY at 48 (footnote omitted).
19. Id. at 49.
20. Id. at 54.
21. Id.
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point, they must be considered when impanelling a jury for any
obscenity case. The author never mentions this strata in our society,
but seems more concerned with commentators who have studied the
issue.
The author finds "some case history" suggesting a causal relation-
ship between pornography and sex offenses, but remarks that it is
clearly in the minority. His focus is on immediate anti-social con-
duct; but he does not consider coalescense, the ripening of action-
prone experiences into behavior. Moreover, he falls into the long-
refuted error of the "Danish experience," saying that after "the
abolition of all restrictions on the sale or exhibition of obscene or
pornographic material . . . there was a decrease in the amount of
sexual crime. ' 2 This result can be explained, however, by noting
the deletion of many sex crimes from the statutes.
Schauer admits that determining the "average person" from
whom "community standards" are drawn, is a difficult problem
unique to obscenity cases." He feels that it is a question of law, to
be solved by judges. But what is the determinant of this "legal
concept"? Is it a majority opinion, or the opinion of expert psycho-
sociologists? Is the Court to decide which experts are validly capable
of representing the "average person"? Perhaps this concept should
best be defined by the jury of each local community, composed of
average men, who on serious reflection are likely to express the true
wisdom of the human species.
The Value of the Work: A Guide in Drafting Law
Roth v. United States established that literary, scientific and
educational materials which do not appeal predominantly to pru-
rient interest are protected materials. Miller v. California maintains
that obscenity exists only if "the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value," and if "the
average person, applying contemporary community standards
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the purient
interest. '"24 From this, the author concludes that, before Roth, the
fact of obscenity was exclusively for jury determination; post-Roth,
22. Id. at 61.
23. Id. at 69-70.
24. 413 U.S. at 24.
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it is a mixed question of law and fact."8 But the author does not
comment, as he perhaps should have, that "community standards"
are determined not by the judge, but by the people at large, repre-
sented by the jury. Only in case of a gross miscarriage of justice by
the jury should the judge intervene. That the judge may have a more
elastic tolerance for obscenity than the community is no basis for
overturning the local community's conscience/concern. Schauer also
feels that "determination of literary, artistic, political or scientific
value seem less majoritarian in purpose,""8 and that the court
should be "more willing to make the ultimate determination even
in the closer cases." 7 In a contest between the judge's particularist
opinion of such matters and the people's sense of what obscenity is,
it is my opinion that the common sense of the people is the true and
final community standard.
The author's discussion of federal and state obscenity laws is a
good survey of the relevant legislation. He remarks that state laws
are "in a constant state of flux," torn between traditional uses of
the state's police powers and the evolving dicta of the Supreme
Court. As noted earlier, the effect of the plurality opinion in
Memoirs was to provoke rapid change in state legislation, a trend
most upsetting to law enforcement efforts.
Procedural Considerations in Obscenity Regulation
A most interesting section of Professor Schauer's book deals with
procedural aspects of obscenity control. Special procedural protec-
tions apply to obscenity cases. Fourth amendment "search and sei-
zure" protections must be respected, since no-warrant seizure is a
form of prior restraint. There must be an opportunity for "some
judicial intervention before public access to the materials in ques-
tion may be curtailed." Double jeopardy and collateral estoppel
protections are also operative." The prosecution must be prepared
to show scienter on the part of the defendant. While federal inter-
vention in state civil proceedings is minimal, the author notes that
state automony is being narrowed.
25. LAW OF OBSCENITY at 148-49.
26. Id. at 151.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 219-22.
[Vol. V
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Enforcement of obscenity laws gives rise to many "prior restraint"
issues. In Freedman v. Maryland,2 the Supreme Court held that
numerous procedural safeguards were required for constitutionally
protected speech." Such safeguards have become so complex that
law enforcement officials often require the assistance of constitu-
tional lawyers. The individual who markets obscene materials is so
well-protected, by book publishers' associations, the motion picture
industry and various special interest groups, that society as a whole
is oppressed by a flood of degenerate materials.
The remainder of The Law of Obscenity is concerned with pre-
trial procedures and tactical trial techniques. In his usual scholarly
way, Professor Schauer unfolds the numerous means that can be
utilized by prosecutor and defense attorney in conducting an ob-
scenity case. This section is informative for bench and bar, as well
as for anyone desiring to initiate legal action respecting obscene
materials. While I admire the author's expertise, I must express my
reservations with some of his evaluations. He places heavy emphasis
on the expert opinions of criminologists, sociologists and psycholo-
gists. Again, I fail to see how these experts can provide a standard
more realistic than the moral sense of the jurors themselves. A point
in issue is the author's treatment of the "religious individual" as a
prospective juror. He remarks:3'
If an individual is religious, and his or her church is active in the anti-
pornography movement, or has strong strictures against sexually explicit
materials, such as do the Catholic Church and most of the fundamentalist
churches, then this individual is likely to be extremely dangerous for the
defense.
This may or may not be true, and it could be passed over as debata-
ble. But when the author adds: "Certainly, if an individual feels it
would be a sin to vote to acquit that which his church condemns,
he cannot be free from bias, and should be excused for cause
... .,, there is a need to challenge this generalization. First, the
vote of the religious juror is made on the basis of the law and the
legal determinants of obscenity-in short, "community standards."
It is likely that he will find a great part of that standard in accord
29. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
30. Id. at 57.
31. LAW OF OBSCENIT at 257.
32. Id.
1977]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
with his opinion. Second, a juror cannot be charged with "bias" on
the basis of objective moral values, unless such bias is simultane-
ously found in one who has no moral values at all or who has only
temporary subjective values. Since all views may be termed "bias,"
discrimination against one type can hardly be permitted in the im-
panelling of a jury.
In concluding this review, let me say that The Law of Obscenity
is an excellent summary and clear analysis of the ideas which have
sprung up in federal and state court rulings since the nineteenth
century. It will be most valuable as a reference for judges and law-
yers who need insights into dealing with sensitive obscenity cases.
References to the leading cases are clear, accurate, and pointed in
exposing the legal idea of obscenity. As the tone of this review has
made clear, my preeminent difference with Professor Schauer is his
omission of a thorough treatment of the religious origins of our con-
stitutional law, and a failure to recognize how such beliefs must
have their expression in the reasoning of the courts.
Edward J. Berbusse, S.J.*
* Associate Professor of History, Fordham University.
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